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Lurz and Krachun (2011) propose a new experimental protocol designed to dis-
criminate genuine mindreading animals from mere behavior-readers and to give
evidence in favor of the claim that chimpanzees are capable of attributing internal
goals to others. ey suggest that chimpanzees’ variety of “internal goal attribu-
tion” consists in attributing to others basic intentional representations, baptized by
Millikan as “pushmi-pullyu representations” (PPs). Now, Millikan (1996; 2004b;
2004a) distinguishes what I propose to call ‘pure’ PPs frommore complex varieties
of PPs, which allow their owners to respond more exibly to their environments.
But, what would happen if we tried to dierentiate, analogously, between more or
less sophisticatedmind-readers in virtue of the sorts of PPs that they could attribute
to others? What would attributing complex PPs consist in and how would such
capacity increase the predictive powers of chimpanzee mind-readers? is paper
oers an answer to these questions. Based on Millikan’s work, I dierentiate two
varieties of complex PPs. en, I examine what a basic mind-reader, only capable
of attributing ‘pure’ PPs, would be able to do. Aer that, I distinguish two more
sophisticated varieties of mindreading, each consisting in the attribution of one of
the complex PPs previously presented, and I show how the ability to attribute com-
plex PPs to others comes withmore potent and exible capacities to anticipate their
behavior. Finally, I oer some reasons to think that attributing complex PPs is still
simpler than full-blownmindreading and I briey evaluate the prospects of extend-
ing this proposal to infant social cognition.
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According to many prominent researchers, nowadays we have good empir-
ical evidence in favor of chimpanzees having a primitive understanding of
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some basic mental states of others, like perceptions, intentions, and goals
(Call and Tomasello 2008; Tomasello and Call 2006; Call 2007; Tomasello
et al. 2003; Call and Jensen 2006). Nevertheless, otherwell-known research-
ers argue that the experimental protocols currently in use are not capable of
eectively distinguishing genuinemind-readers frommere behavior-readers
(Penn and Povinelli 2007; Povinelli and Vonk 2003; Povinelli and Vonk
2004). is methodological aw has been labeled as “the logical problem.”
According to it, the empirical results provided by extant studies do not give
us good reasons to conclude that there are any non-human species capable
of attributing mental states to others.
Lurz and Krachun (2011) propose a way to advance this debate, both
conceptually and empirically, focusing on whether chimpanzees are capa-
ble of attributing to others a specic kind of mental state: internal goals
(see also Lurz 2011). In order to move forward empirically, they propose a
new protocol that can solve the logical problem and, eventually, give sup-
port to the claim that chimpanzees attribute internal goals to others. To
move forward conceptually, they outline an alternative account of mind-
reading—the appearance-reality mindreading theory (ARM)—and suggest
that chimpanzees’ variety of “internal goal attribution” consists in attribut-
ing to others some basic intentional representations, baptized byMillikan as
“pushmi-pullyu representations” (PPs).
In dierent papers, Millikan (1996; 2004b; 2004a) has characterized
pushmi-pullyu representations (PPs) and has suggested a distinction be-
tween what I will call ‘pure PPs’ and more sophisticated varieties of PPs,
which endow their owners with the capacity to respond to their environ-
ments in more exible ways. By distinguishing kinds of PPs, it becomes
possible to account for some dierences in the cognitive and behavioral ca-
pacities of those non-human animals to whichwe attribute such representa-
tions. However, what would happen if we tried to dierentiate, analogously,
between more or less sophisticated mind-readers in virtue of the sort of PPs
that they attribute to others? What would being able to attribute complex
PPs consist in and how would such capacity increase the predictive powers
of animal mind-readers?
In this paper, I will try to answer these questions by proposing a way to
distinguish basic mind-readers, who only attribute pure PPs to others, from
(slightly)more sophisticatedmind-readers, capable of attributingmore com-
plex PPs. Even though Lurz and Krachun do not explicitly contemplate this
possibility, I think it is compatible with their original proposal and con-
tributes to enrich it. Based on Millikan’s work, I begin by delimiting two
varieties of PPs, which are more sophisticated than pure PPs.en I exam-
ine what a basic mind-reader, capable only of attributing pure PPs, would
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be able to do. Aer that, I distinguish two more sophisticated varieties of
mindreading, each consisting in the attribution of one of the complex PPs
previously presented, and I show how the ability to attribute complex PPs to
others comes with more potent and exible capacities to anticipate their be-
havior. Finally, I present some reasons to think that the capacities to attribute
complex PPs are still simpler than the full-blownmindreading of (adult) hu-
man animals and I discuss the potential benets of extending this proposal
to research on the mindreading abilities of human infants.
1. Lurz and Krachun’s proposal
In their paper, Lurz and Krachun (2011) focus on whether animals can rep-
resent the internal goals of others (understood as motivational mental states
that may represent objects or states of aairs that an agent tries to obtain
or realize). Following Povinelli and colleagues, they arm that all current
experimental paradigms used to test mindreading abilities in non-human
animals are methodologically awed and face the aforementioned logical
problem.
Since our minds cannot be directly observed, Povinelli claims, our at-
tributions of mental states to others must be based, inevitably, on some ob-
servable behaviors of the agent and/or on relevant environmental features.
Now, current tests make the relevant cues available to the experimental sub-
jects and presuppose that they notice them. But, then, we have two possi-
bilities. On the one hand, a subject’s predictions about another agent’s fu-
ture behavior can involve multiple inferential steps—at least a rst one from
the observable cues to the other’s mental states and a second one from the
other’s mental states to her/his subsequent behavior. On the other hand, the
behavioral predictions can be made directly in one step, based on knowl-
edge of the contingent relationship between the relevant observable features
and the agent’s subsequent behavior. us, when some animals predict the
behavior of others in a way which suggests they are mindreading, it is al-
ways possible to give an alternative explanation, according to which they
are exclusively basing their predictions on “behavioral rules” that associate
the available behavioral/environmental cues with the consecutive behavior
of the agent (Povinelli and Vonk 2004; Povinelli and Vonk 2003; Penn and
Povinelli 2007).
Now, Lurz andKrachun think it is possible to overcome the logical prob-
lem if we: (i) identify some predictions about the behavior of others that can
be made if we attribute mental states to them, but which cannot be made on
the basis of externally observable cues alone; and (ii) design an experiment
which can test if chimpanzees are capable of making precisely these sort of
predictions.
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In their opinion, current experimental protocols do not satisfy (i) and
(ii). However, they propose a new test designed to distinguish a mere be-
havior-reader from a chimpanzee capable of attributing internal goals to
others. eir proposal is supported by a specic theory of mindreading:
the appearance-reality mindreading theory (ARM). According to the ARM,
the capacity to attribute mental states to others evolved in some species be-
cause, in certain settings, it enabled them to predict the behavior of other
agents in a better way than their behavior-reading rivals. In particular, the
mind-reader has leverage over behavior-readers in those situations in which
an object appears to have properties that it does not really have. In such illu-
sory settings, the way in which a distal object appears to an agent is a better
predictor of its behavior than how the object really is. Now, the problem for
behavior-reading animals is that they can only appeal to reality-based facts
(like the agent’s past behavior, its current physical position, etc.,) in order
to make their predictions. Mind-readers, on the contrary, would also be ca-
pable of identifying the subjective modes in which external objects appear
to the agents and of employing this information to adequately predict their
behavior on illusory settings.
It is important to remark that, since in illusory settings a mind-reader
would have predictive capacities that a behavior-reader will necessarily lack,
it becomes possible for researchers, at least in principle, to nd a way to test
such dierences satisfying (i) and (ii). With this idea in mind, Lurz and
Krachun elaborate a complex experiment to test if chimpanzees are capable
of anticipating the actions of a human competitor by understanding how
illusory perceptual states look like to him.
Very roughly, in their test, a chimpanzee and a human competitor are
placed in adjoining rooms divided by a clear Plexiglass wall. Against the
wall, on the competitor’s side, there is a table with a sliding platform and
two transparent glass containers with opaque lids. Above each of them, on
the wall, there are two small holes through which the chimpanzee can stick
a nger to choose one of the containers. In front of the competitor, there
is an opaque backdrop with two curtained windows, aligned with the con-
tainers. e competitor can stick an arm through any of the windows to
indicate his choice. An experimenter, present in the room, puts grapes on
both containers and slides them within the reach of the contestants.
During the pre-test trials, the human and the chimpanzee take turns
choosing the grapes from non-distorting glass containers. When the com-
petitor is absent, the experimenter puts a big grape in one container and a
small grape on the other, while the chimpanzee observes those actions, and
closes the lids. Aer that, the competitor enters the room, sits in front of
the table and looks at each grape through the glass containers before staring
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straight ahead. At thatmoment, one of two bells rings (one bell indicates that
the experimenter is going to slide the table over the competitor allowing him
to choose rst, the other one indicates that the table will be slid before the
chimpanzee which will make the rst choice).en, the platform is slid over
the appropriate contestant. When allowed to choose rst, the competitor al-
ways prefers the big grape to the small one and the chimpanzee is expected
to learn this during the pre-test trials.
During the proper test, the same procedure takes place with one excep-
tion: in some cases, while the chimpanzee is watching, the grapes are placed
inside size-distorting containers with opaque lids. One of the containers
magnies the size of the grape and the other minimizes it. Since the com-
petitor is outside while this happens, he cannot watch the change in the ap-
parent sizes of the grapes once they are inside each container.
What should happen if chimpanzees could attribute perceptual states
about how things look to others and make predictions about their future
behavior based on such attributions? In such a case, Lurz and Krachun con-
jecture, chimpanzees should be able to anticipate that the competitor will
select the container with the grape that looks bigger when choosing rst.
Consequently, they should look rst to the window in front of the magni-
fying container aer hearing the competitor’s bell. Besides, since they un-
derstand the dierence between how grapes look inside the containers and
how they really are, when choosing rst they should prefer the grapes that
appear smaller, but are in fact the bigger ones.1
Now, if chimpanzees were only behavior-readers, they would not be able
to replicate these responses. Being incapable of dierentiating how things
1 ere is a well-known distinction between two ways in which young children may under-
stand the perspective of others: level 1 and level 2 perspective-taking. e former refers
to the basic capacity to understand what another person visually perceives or not (Flavell
1992).e latter, instead, refers to amore complex understanding of how someone else per-
ceives the world. Now, in order to succeed at Lurz and Krachun’s test, chimpanzees would
need not only to identify what object—the grape—can be seen by the competitor, but also
how the object looks or appears to him. It seems, then, that they would need to go beyond
level 1 visual perspective-taking. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that this protocol
is not as demanding as the typical tasks of level 2 perspective-taking, which usually re-
quire the tested subject to understand that a single object can be seen or conceptualized in
dierent ways from multiple perspectives. Strictly speaking, chimpanzees do not need to
understand that the same object—the grape—can be seen in multiple ways from dierent
perspectives, nor do they need to contrast how things visually appear to a competitor with
how they appear to them. e grape inside the size-distorting jar looks exactly the same
to both the chimp and the competitor.us, it seems that chimps only need to distinguish
how the grape visually appears (to them and to the competitor) with how it is (See Moll
andMeltzo 2011 for an interesting suggestion on the need to distinguish dierent kinds of
level 2 visual perspective-taking which may help to explain the specic kinds of cognitive
abilities involved in Lurz and Krachun’s test).
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are from how they perceptually appear to others, they would show, instead,
one of the following behavioral patterns: (a) anticipate that the competitor
will choose the fruit from the magnifying container rst, and choose the
same fruit themselves (because they also think this is the bigger one); or (b)
choose the fruit from the minimizing container when they go rst, but ex-
pect the same behavior from their rivals (because they think this is where
the bigger grape in fact is).us, Lurz and Krachun claim that their test al-
lows us to discriminate neatly between mind-readers and behavior-readers
by predicting that each of themwill give dierent patterns of responses.ey
seem to have found, then, an appropriate tool to overcome Povinelli’s prob-
lem.
To sum up: Lurz and Krachun claim that chimpanzees can only suc-
ceed in their experimental protocol by attributing somemental states to their
competitors. e reason why they think their design ensures that a mental
attribution is taking place is that the task that chimpanzees face can only
be solved if they are capable of contrasting how the grape inside the size-
distorting jar appears to the naive competitor with how it really is. But, is
this really so?
As far as I can see, the only way to challenge such a conclusion is to
come up with a plausible alternative behavior-reading hypothesis, capable
of explaining the successful behavior of the chimpanzees. To the best of
my knowledge, only Andrews (2015) has presented an objection along these
lines. According to her, chimpanzees may have learned, during the familiar-
ization trials, that the human competitors choose the bigger grape. en,
during the proper test, the chimps can use that experience to expect the
competitors to go on choosing the large looking grape. Nevertheless, the
chimpanzees will choose the other grape because “they can use their own
past experience to set up their own goals but they need not know why they
were able to solve the task” (cf. Andrews 2015, 148).
Now, despite what she claims, Andrews’ hypothesis does not seem to
be a mere behavior-reading one. What chimpanzees have learned during
familiarization trials is that human competitors usually choose the bigger
grape. But, in the actual tests, the situation is relevantly dierent from those
trials, because the chimps know, based on their previous experience, that
the grape that looks bigger is in fact the smaller one. So they cannot merely
project what they have learned during familiarization trials to the test situ-
ation (i.e., that there is a correlation between the real size of the grapes and
the behavior of the competitors). What they need to do is to anticipate that
the competitor will choose the grape that looks bigger, while integrating that
information with their own knowledge about the real size of the grape in or-
der tomake their own better-informed choice. But this already implies being
214 Pushmi-pullyu Representations and Mindreading in Chimpanzees
capable of drawing the appearance/reality distinction and of understanding
that their competitors will choose grapes based on how they appear to them
and not on their real size. Something that, as Lurz and Krachun repeatedly
point out, mere behavior readers cannot do. Whether chimpanzees can also
understand that drawing such distinctions and making those attributions is
why they are able to solve the task is not relevant here.emere fact that they
can draw the appearance/reality distinction and project it to others suces
to indicate that chimps are (some kind of) mind-readers. Of course, some-
one else may come up with a better behavior-reading hypothesis but, until
that happens, we have pretty good reasons to think that Lurz and Krachuns’
experiment does solve the logical problem and is capable of providing solid
evidence of chimpanzees’ mindreading.
Moreover, as Lurz et al. have argued recently, there are reasons to be op-
timistic about chimpanzees being capable of succeeding at their test (Lurz
et al. 2014). As they point out, we have evidence that chimps have many of
the component skills involved in such a task. ey are capable, for exam-
ple, of engaging in competitive tasks over food with humans as well as other
conspecics (Hare and Tomasello 2004) and they can anticipate a competi-
tor’s action, adjusting their behavior accordingly (Hare et al. 2006; Schmelz
et al. 2013). Finally, we also have some evidence that chimpanzees succeed in
experiments designed to test whether they can distinguish appearance from
reality (Krachun et al. 2009).2 Clearly, the authors admit, none of this guar-
antees that chimpanzees will be also capable of using all these skills simul-
taneously in the kind of complex task designed by Lurz and Krachun (2011).
is is something that will have to be tested. Nonetheless, it does show that
it is not too far-fetched to think that this protocol can be implemented and,
even more, that it can yield positive results.
2. Varieties of PPs and kinds of mindreading
2.1 Attributing pure PPs
At this point, one might ask: why should we think that Lurz and Krachun’s
new protocol does test whether chimpanzees are capable of internal goal at-
2 It might be argued that chimpanzees’ poor performance on false belief tasks (Hare et al.
2001; Kaminski et al. 2008) gives us reasons to doubt that they will be able to attribute
false perceptual states to others, as this task requires. Against that objection, Lurz et al.
(2014) respond that attributing false perceptions to others should be easier for chimps than
attributing false beliefs. Succeeding on traditional false belief tasks requires representing
the inferences that lead others from past or current evidential information to their false
beliefs. Succeeding in false perception tasks, on the contrary, does not require representing
the others’ inferences, since their false perceptual states are caused by currently viewing an
illusory object.
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tribution? Doesn’t it rather test their capacity to attribute perceptual states
to others? e answer to such questions lies in Lurz and Krachun’s sugges-
tion that what chimpanzees would be attributing to their competitors are not
traditional perceptual states but pushmi-pullyu representations (PPs). Mil-
likan (1996; 2004b; 2004a) portrays PPs as the most simple and primitive
intentional representations that a creature may have; representations whose
distinctive feature is that they fulll, at the same time, two inseparable func-
tions: (i) a descriptive function to provide perceptual information about the
external world (‘this is a large grape’); and (ii) a directive function to indi-
cate what the organism should do in such a situation (‘grab it and eat it’).
As a result, at least the simplest PPs—pure PPs—aect our actions directly,
triggering a behavioral response in an automatic and inexible way. us,
if chimpanzees attribute PPs to others, they are simultaneously attributing
some sort of perceptual content (i) and some kind of internal goal (ii).3
Lurz and Krachun add to these requirements that mindreading chim-
panzees must be capable of understanding that the descriptive face of the
PP may dier from reality. And, as we have seen before, this is something
that a mere behavior-reader will be incapable of anticipating. It is important
to notice, though, that even if, according to Millikan’s theory, the descrip-
tive content of a PP can be incorrect when things appear perceptually to its
owner in a way that diers from how they really are, it does not follow from
this that an animal which attributes PPs to others should be capable of grasp-
ing or appreciating that fact.e last one is an additional requirement added
by Lurz and Krachun in order to be able to solve Povinelli’s problem.4
3 It seems tome that Lurz andKrachun are only oering here a plausible interpretation of the
(hypothetical) positive results of their experiment. But their protocol does not conclusively
favor the idea that chimpanzees are attributing pushmi-pullyus over other kinds of mental
states like, for example, perceptual sates. In section 3, I oer some general reasons in favor
of the former interpretation. Briey, I argue that the dierent varieties of “pushmi-pullyu
mindreading” which I will examine in this paper are all psychologically simpler than full-
blown mindreading and, as such, can provide us with valuable tools to account for the
dierent capacities (and limitations) of infants and non-human primates in the domain of
social cognition. If all this is sound, I think it can provide some additional support to Lurz
and Krachun’s suggestion.
4 I will not question this requirement, at least in the case of animal mindreading. On the
contrary, I will assume here that it must also apply to the more demanding varieties of
animal mindreading which I will delineate below. To be very clear: from now on I will be
proposing dierent varieties of mindreading, all of which require that mindreading chim-
panzees, which attribute some complex varieties of PPs to others, must also be capable of
distinguishing how things appear to others from how they really are. is is not a gratu-
itous or supercial decision, since two reasons justify it. Like Lurz and Krachun, I take the
logical problem seriously and I think that adding this requirement to my proposal gives
me a good way of overcoming it. Besides that, I think that it is also heuristically interest-
ing, at least initially, to defend a model of chimpanzee mindreading, according to which
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Clearly, the ability to attribute PPs is very dierent from the capacity to
attribute standard psychological goals. Internal goals are usually thought to
be directive psychological states. ey refer to what their owner purports
to do and can only guide the behavior of an agent when they are combined,
through a process of practical inference, with descriptivemental states about
how the world in fact is (Millikan 2004b). What follows from this is that at-
tributing standard prescriptive internal goals should necessarily come with
the additional capacity to attribute descriptivemental states, like perceptions
and beliefs, and with some talent to represent—or somehow track—the in-
ferential relations between these two varieties of mental states. Otherwise,
our mind-reader would lack the means to make adequate predictions about
how the others are going to behave.
Attributing pure PPs, however, is a less demanding cognitive activity,
because it only requires the capacity to form a single representation that
indicates at once how the agent purports to act based on how it perceives
the environment. Still, such simplicity comes with a cost: the mind-reader
who attributes PPs will always predict the same behavioral response from
the agent: the one that gures in their prescriptive contents.
Nevertheless, in her work, Millikan distinguishes other more complex
varieties of PPs which allow dierent non-human species to behave in more
exible ways (Millikan 1996; 2004b; 2004a). But, then, it seems legitimate
to ask: what would happen if we tried to dierentiate, analogously, between
more or less sophisticated mind-readers in virtue of the sorts of PPs that
they could attribute to others? What would attributing complex PPs consist
in? And, in which ways would such capacities increase the exibility and
predictive powers of chimpanzee mind-readers? In the next section, I will
try to oer an answer to these questions.
chimps would be very sophisticated in one sense—since they should be capable of drawing
the appearance/reality distinction and of projecting it to others—and rather primitive in
a dierent sense—since they will not need to represent the inferential links between the
mental states of others (see section 3.1). One virtue of such amodel, I think, is that it clearly
distinguishes, and compels us to look for two dierent kinds of evidence: on the one hand,
evidence that they are capable of detecting how things appear to others and contrasting
this with how they really are (which indicates that they are not mere behavior-readers)
and, on the other hand, evidence that chimps attribute dierent sorts of two-faced PPs
(rather than traditional propositional attitudes). at being said, I admit that if we even-
tually nd out that chimps do not pass Lurz andKrachun’s test, wemay choose to develop a
model of chimpanzee mindreading that, while not demanding the capacity to distinguish
appearances from reality, would still consist in the attribution of dierent kinds of PPs.
With the appropriate modications, much of what I propose here could still be useful for
such a task. But, if that were the case, we would still need to nd a good way to overcome
or dismiss the logical problem.
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2.2 Attributing complex pushmi-pullyu representations
Without pretending to be exhaustive, it is possible to distinguish at least two
ways in which pushmi-pullyu representations became more complex. One
importantmodication takes place, according toMillikan (2004b), when an
animal not only acts following the directive face of a PP, but also modies
its responses according to (some of) its internal motivational states. us,
an animal may perceive a prey nearby, but it will only follow the directive
‘go aer the prey’, issued by its PP, when it is hungry. If, on the contrary,
the animal feels satiated, it will not respond to the PP indicating the pres-
ence of the prey.ese are not pure PPs, because there is not an imperative
content compelling the animal to act no matter what, but rather a “poten-
tially directive face” which will guide its behavior in a certain way if some
additional psychological conditions are fullled. Following Duhau (2006),
we can call them ‘pushmi-possible-pullyu’ representations (PPPs). Despite
their greater complexity, PPPs are still relatively inexible in the following
sense: each of them only indicates one possibility of action. An animal may
not act as indicated by its PPP when it lacks the adequate motivation, but it
is not possible for this animal to represent the state of aairs which gures
in the descriptive content of the PPP and still behave in a dierent way from
the one prescribed by it.
However, what would happen with amind-readerM capable of attribut-
ing PPPs? Firstly, M would have to be able not only to attribute perceptual-
directive representations to others, but also to detect or track those motiva-
tional states that would lead them to act as the PPP indicates (or not). How
can M accomplish such a thing? One option would be that M could explic-
itly represent the motivational states of another creature C, like hunger or
thirst. ere is, nevertheless, a second option: that M merely detects some
behavioral and/or gestural signs reliably correlated with those states. us,
for example, instead of perceiving C’s hunger, M may perceive its prompt-
ness to turn to the food, the way in which it leans its body, etc., as signs that
indicate that C will try to fetch it.
Now, what would it take to establish whether an animal attributes PPPs
to others? Roughly, I think we would need to have experimental protocols
that allow us to test two things:
(i) If a mind-reader M is capable of attributing to another creature C
a pushmi-pullyu representation of an object O with a content in
which O is represented as being dierent from how M knows that
O really is. Testing this requires nding out if M can correctly pre-
dict the behavior that C would perform if C had an inadequate or
illusory pushmi-pullyu.
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(ii) If M is capable of predicting the response of C to an inadequate or
illusory pushmi-pullyu (Cwill choose the grape that looks big) only
when M also detects that C is in the adequate motivational state (C
is hungry), and of making a dierent prediction for cases in which
C is not in such state (C is not hungry).
Now, we already knowhow to assess if the predictive capacities described
in (i) are present, because this is exactly what Lurz and Krachun’s original
test was for. What we need is to nd a way to test the capacities described in
(ii). And this is something that requires designing a protocol which allows
us to test whether M can attribute a PPP to C not only in virtue of how an
object O appears to C but also in virtue of C’s current motivational states.5
Let us turn now to another variety of complex pushmi-pullyu.e sec-
ond important modication in the representational capacities of animals
arises when they become capable of perceiving several dierent aordances,
or possibilities of action, in the same object (Millikan 2004b). In such ani-
mals, which aordance they eectively follow will vary depending on their
5 is is a rough sketch of what I have in mind. Assuming that chimpanzees have already
succeeded at Lurz and Krachun’s experiment and that they attribute PPs, we could run an
experiment, using a violation of expectation method, to assess whether they also attribute
PPPs. In the familiarization phase, chimpanzees will be shown a video of another chimp
C being allowed by an experimenter to choose between a big grape, a small grape and an
attractive toy. In the video, C chooses the big grape and the experimenter takes it away
before C can eat it (this should allow the chimpanzees to learn that C is motivated to eat
grapes and that C prefers the big grape rather than the small grape or the attractive toy).
Next, chimpanzees will be divided in two groups. Group I will watch a video of chimp
C being fed with grapes which have been seasoned with an invisible and unpleasant avor
so that, aer trying one of those, C rejects to continue eating (bad avor condition).en,
C goes away from the room and the experimenter puts a big grape and a small one in size-
distorting jars next to the attractive toy. In turn, Group II will watch a video in which the
other chimp C conspicuously tries to obtain a grape in vain (hunger condition). en C
goes outside and the experimenter puts a big grape and a small grape in size-distorting
jars next to the attractive toy. In both conditions, when C returns to the room, it is given to
choose between these three things.en the chimps will be shown three videos: in video
1 C chooses the toy; in video 2 C opts for the grape that looks smaller and eats it; in video
3 C chooses the grape that looks bigger and eats it.
If chimps were capable of attributing PPPs to others, the ones in Group I should look
longer at C, in the bad avor condition, when it chooses the big or the small grape instead
of the toy (videos 2 and 3), while chimpanzees in the second group should look longer at
hungry C when it chooses the toy (video 1) or when it chooses the grape that looks smaller
over the one which looks bigger (video 2). If, on the contrary, chimpanzees were only PP
mind-readers that rigidly linked certain perceptions to the same behavioral prescriptions,
their expectations about the behavior of C should be the same ones for the two groups.
I think that, with due polishing, this is a protocol that could help us distinguish mind-
reading-chimpanzees which only attribute PPs from chimpanzees capable of attributing
PPPs.
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context, motivations and necessities at a given moment.us, chimpanzees
can perceive and use a leaf as a sponge to catchwater (Goodall 1968;McGrew
2004), as a napkin towipe o bodily uids or plant juices (Goodall 1968; Mc-
Grew 2004), or as a cushion to seat more comfortably while doing terrestrial
tasks (Hirata et al. 1998; McGrew 2004).6 I would like to suggest that these
animals have what can be called ‘pushmi-multiple-pullyu representations’
(PMPs) which allow them to represent the same object as aording dierent
possibilities of action in dierent situations, and consequently compel them
to act in dierent ways toward that object.
Imagine now amind-readerM capable of attributing to another creature
C the perception of dierent aordances, in the same object, under dier-
ent circumstances. Clearly, the cognitive capacities involved in such feat are
more demanding than the ones required to attribute the other two varieties
of pushmi-pullyu representations examined before. When all M attributes
to C are pure PPs, or even PPPs, each of these representations indicates only
one way in which C must act. As a consequence, M will always predict the
same behavioral response from C: the one indicated by the pushmi-pullyu
representation which M has attributed to C. At most, if M is attributing a
PPP to C, then M will be able to abstain from making the relevant behav-
ioral prediction when C is not in the adequate motivational state. In con-
trast, the mind-readerM capable of attributing to C the perception of dier-
ent aordances in the same object O will have to determine which of those
aordances is currently guiding C’s behavior in order to make a successful
behavioral prediction. But, how canM do that? It seems reasonable to think
6 One may wonder at this point: if M is attributing to C a PMP with a descriptive content
in which an object is seen as aording a specic possibility of action, how does this dif-
fer from attributing traditional propositional contents? e answer depends on how one
understands the notion of propositional content. Sometimes, philosophers assume that a
mental state has propositional content if and only if it represents theworld as being in a cer-
tain way (Searle 1983). It certainly seems that, in this minimal sense, the directive content
of a PMPwould be propositional. But it is also possible to think, in amore demandingway,
that propositional contents must also have a sentence-like structure (Cf. Millikan 2004b,
92–93). is means, amongst other things, that propositional contents must be consti-
tuted by representational units (concepts) that can be freely re-combined to generate new
thoughts. But the directive contents of PMPs need not be like that. A chimpanzee may
come to have a limited set of contents like: ‘this leaf is usable as a hat’ and ‘this stone is
usable as a hammer’ which represent dierent states of aairs. But these contents may not
admit being decomposed and recombined in the same ways that propositional contents
can. e chimp may not be able, for example, to have a thought like ‘this leaf is a ham-
mer’ like we can do. is line of thinking allow us both to think that PPs may represent
objects as being in certain ways, while at the same time denying that they collapse with
propositional contents. (For a dierent proposal on how to understand animal contents,
which is propositional in the non-demanding sense, and non-propositional in the more
demanding one, see Bermúdez 2003).
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that the aordances that guide C’s action will depend on C’s necessities, its
motivational states, and its present context. If C is playing, it will probably
climb a tree to make stunts; if C is scared because there is a predator nearby,
it may use the tree as a hiding place, etc. en, to determine which aor-
dance is guiding C’s behavior, M will need to attend not only to the object
perceived byC, but also toC’smotivational states and to the practical context
in which C’s actions are taking place.
Anyway, mindreading animals capable of attributing PMPs will have a
more versatile capacity to predict the behaviors of others, since they will be
able to:
(i) Anticipate that, in certain circumstances or under certain motiva-
tional states, C will act in a way A1 towards object O.
(ii) Refrain from predicting that C will act in the way A1 towards O
when C is not in the appropriate circumstances or lacks the ade-
quate motivational states.
(iii) Anticipate that, in a dierent context and with dierent motiva-
tions, C will act in front of O in the way A2.7
Finally, I think it is also possible to empirically distinguish between a
mindreading animal which only attributes pure PPs or PPPs to others, from
an animal capable of attributing to others the capacity to perceive multiple
aordances in a given object. To test this dierence, the following will be
required: (i) putting M and C in front of the same object O while varying
relevant contextual features and/or the motivational states of C that, pre-
sumably, will change the aordances that C perceives in O; and (ii) checking
if M is capable of predicting the changes in C’s responses to those dierent
aordances.is is a complex task, but I think it is also a viable one, mainly
because the theoretical rationale behind Lurz and Krachun’s original exper-
iment still holds in this case. Aer all, no matter which one of O’s multiple
aordances is guiding C’s behavior, it is always possible that C perceives O in
a way that diers fromM’s knowledge of howO really is. In such a case, what
will be relevant to successfully predict C’s internal goals and C’s subsequent
behaviors will be how things appear to it and not how they really are. And,
as it happened in other cases, only mind-readers capable of grasping such a
dierence will be able to adequately predict C’s behavior and to adjust their
own behavior accordingly.
7 It is interesting to compare these sets of abilities to the predictive powers of the mind-
reader which can only attribute pure PPs to others, and to the mind-reader which can, at
most, attribute PPPs to them.e rst one is only capable of (i) and the second one of (i)
and (ii).
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3. Mindreading as an attribution of pushmi-pullyu representa-
tions: Further issues
Up to now, I have provided a rudimentary characterization of two new va-
rieties of mindreading that non-human animals might have. Basically, they
both consist in the capacity of attributing some complex types of pushmi-
pullyu representations to others. Everything I have outlined so far is rather
speculative and it seems that, until we have relevant empirical evidence on its
favor, thesemodels will not have earned its keep.8 But, even lacking such ev-
idence, there are two further issues which I would like to discuss in this sec-
tion: what distinguishes the varieties of mindreading proposed so far from
full-blownmindreading, andwhetherwe can legitimately extend the present
proposal to research on the social cognition abilities of non-human infants.
3.1 Attributing complex pushmi-pullyu representations vs. full-
blown mindreading
Firstly, I would like to focus on whether the more sophisticated varieties
of pushmi-pullyu mindreading which I have proposed are genuinely dif-
ferent from, and simpler than, full-blown mindreading. According to Mil-
likan (2004b, 174), as a representational system becomesmore sophisticated,
pushmi-pullyu representations progressively come apart, and descriptive
representations detach and become independent from directive ones. Fol-
lowing this idea, we can use the notion of ‘detached mental states’ to refer to
those intentional mental states which have a directive or a descriptive con-
tent, but not both at the same time. Traditional propositional attitudeswould
be our paradigmatic example of this kind of mental states.
Making use of this notion, it can be claimed that full-blown human
mind-readers predict and explain the behavior of other creatures by attribut-
ing detached mental states to them. Some of these mental states have a de-
scriptive function and others a directive one, and they can gure in dierent
varieties of practical reasoning which guide the behavior of the interpreted
agents. Presumably, then, the mind-reader who attributes this kind of men-
8 It is interesting to point out, anyway, that if we assume that chimpanzees are mind-
readers—ignoring the logical problem for a while—, there is some evidence hinting that
they must be capable of attributing at least one variety of complex pushmi-pullyus: PPs.
According to Call et al. (2004) chimpanzees respond dierently (gesturing more and leav-
ing the testing situation earlier) when an unwilling experimenter fails to give them a grape
thanwhen the same experimenter is unable to do so.is experiment could be interpreted,
I suggest, as showing that chimps are attributing to both experimenters a PPP with a de-
scriptive content ‘this is a grape’ and a potentially prescriptive content ‘give it to the chimp’
that will only be followed if the experimenter is motivated to do so.
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tal states must represent those inferences—or somehow track them—in or-
der to be able to produce adequate predictions of the others’ behaviors.
Clearly, this is dierent fromwhat the basicmind-readerM, whomerely
attributes pure PPs, does. Firstly, M can predict what another creature Cwill
do merely by attributing to C one mental state (instead of multiple ones)
which rigidly combines a perceptual content with a prescriptive one. Sec-
ondly, the behavioral prediction will directly follow from that single attribu-
tion without requiring from M any capacity to track or represent any infer-
ential processes in C. Even a creature completely incapable of representing
the inferential processes of others could be a mind-reader in this minimal
sense. At least in this regard, it seems that attributing pure PPs is psycholog-
ically (or cognitively) simpler than full-blown mindreading.
Nevertheless, at this point, one might wonder whether the attribution
of complex PPs is really dierent, in a relevant sense, from traditional full-
blown mindreading. I will try to clarify why such worries arise for each of
the attributions of complex PPs that I have distinguished, and how they can
be removed.
Firstly, I would like to examine the case of the mind-reader who at-
tributes PPPs. As we have seen, this kind of mind-reader attributes a de-
scriptive/potentially directive mental state to another creature C which in-
dicates, at the same time, what it is out there in the world and what C should
do about it, if it happens to be appropriatelymotivated. To accomplish such a
task, this mind-reader will have to track two dierent kinds of mental states:
(a) the PPP and (b) themotivational state that “activates” the imperative face
of the PPP. Presumably, this would allow mind-reader M to attribute to C,
who faces an object O, a PPP that simultaneously indicates the presence of O
and how to act towards it. But, it will also allowM to distinguish two kinds of
situations: (i) one in which C, being properly motivated, will act as the pre-
scriptive side of the PPP commands; from (ii) a dierent situation in which,
lacking the necessary motivation, C will not act as the PPP prescribes. As a
consequence, our mind-reader will be able to predict that, in situation (i), C
will act in the way prescribed by the PPP, while, in situation (ii), C will not
act in such a way.us, imagine that M is trying to anticipate the behavior
of a rival C who is in front of a piece of food. M will be able to attribute to C
the PPP: ‘food there / (if motivated) grab it and eat it!’ Now, M will be also
capable of detecting whether C is motivated—i.e., hungry—(situation (i)),
or not (situation (ii)), and to predict that in (i) C will grab the food and eat
it, while in (ii) it will leave the food untouched.
Yet, at this point onemay ask: why shouldn’t we characterizeM’s capacity
to discriminate situation (i) and (ii) in terms of M attributing to C in both
situations the same descriptive mental state (‘food there’) but two dierent
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desires (the desire to eat food in (i) and the desire not to eat food in (ii))? I
think that this is a viable alternative and that a mind-reader who attributes
beliefs and desires should be capable of distinguishing situation (i) and (ii),
as well as being capable of making adequate predictions in both cases. But
what I would like to defend is that the abilities displayed by such a mind-
reader are substantially dierent from the ones displayed by themind-reader
M, whomerely attributes PPPs. Secondly, I will argue that whatM is doing is
psychologically less demanding from what a mind-reader which attributes
detached beliefs and desires would need to do in order to achieve similar
results. Finally, I think that such a gain in simplicity is, at least in principle, a
good reason to favor this way of characterizing the socio-cognitive abilities
of creatures like non-human primates and young human infants that, for all
we know, are cognitively less sophisticated than normal human adults.
Let us begin by clarifying where the dierence lies between attributing
detached beliefs and desires, on the one hand, and attributing PPPs, on the
other.e rst thing to point out is that, unlike detachedmental states, a PPP
inexorably constrains how the interpreted creature C behaves when facing
an object O. In contrast, a creature which is, for example, in a purely descrip-
tive perceptual state can givemultiple dierent responses depending on how
the aforementioned perception combines with her or his othermental states.
If we extrapolate this to mindreading, the following consequence fol-
lows. As stated above, traditional mind-readers will have to attribute at least
two dierent kinds of mental states—i.e., beliefs and desires—with two dif-
ferent contents clearly specied, in order to predict how C is going to act.
Evenmore, in order tomake adequate predictions, theywill have to attribute
to C dierent desires, with dierent contents in situations (i) and (ii). On the
contrary, a mind-reader M, which attributes PPPs, can make the correct be-
havioral predictions in both situations by attributing to C one and the same
PPP, and then detecting if C is in a motivational state that can “activate” the
prescriptive side of the PPP, causing C to act as the PPP commands (or not).
e interesting thing is that M does not have to represent the intentional
content of such motivational state, since the content that suces to explain
what C will do is already rigidly contained in the directive face of the PPP.
us,Mdoes not need to attribute, like a full-blownmind-reader, two dier-
ent desires, each with its own content, in situation (i) and (ii). M can predict
C’s behaviormerely by attributing one isolated intentionalmental state—the
PPP—plus a “contentless” motivational state that merely indicates whether
C’s is “on” or “o” to act as the PPP commands.
Imagine, for example, that M attributes the PPP ‘food there, (if moti-
vated) grab it!’ to C.en, M may still need to nd out whether C is moti-
vated to act as the PPP commands, but once that is done, all the information
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thatM needs to predict about howCwill act—grabbing the food—is already
contained in the PPP. M does not need to attribute to C an additional desire
to grab the food in question.
Even more, as suggested above, M may be “tracking” C’s motivational
statesmerely by detecting some behavioral and/or gestural signs reliably cor-
relatedwith those states.us, for example, instead of perceivingC’s hunger,
Mmay perceive its promptness to turn to the food, the way in which it leans
its body, etc., as signs that indicate that C will try to fetch it.9
But why, one may insist, should we consider these dierences between
attributing PPPs and full-blown mindreading to be relevant from a psycho-
logical point of view? At least for two reasons. Once again, we can begin
by pointing out that attributing PPPs is not only a dierent, but also a psy-
chologically simpler task. Why is this so? Mainly because, unlike full-blown
mind-readers, the mind-reader M which attributes PPPs to others will not
need to represent any kind of inferential link between dierent decoupled
mental states (e.g., beliefs and desires) with their respective contents. M will
only have to posit a non-inferential (causal) relationship between a motiva-
tional state, devoid of any content, and the PPP attributed to C, in which the
former “activates” the directive content of the latter. In other words: all M
needs to do is to: (i) attribute a PPP representation to C and (ii) detect if
that PPP is “on” or “o” or, in other terms, detect whether, at that moment,
the PPP will or will not guide C’s behavior.is is all that ‘tracking C’s mo-
tivational states’ amounts to. But, reasoning about the causal link between
a motivational state devoid of content and a representational PPP is not the
same as being somehow able to represent the reasoning of other creatures, or
the inferential links between the contents of their dierent representational
mental states.
Furthermore, it can be argued that representing and understanding how
dierent mental contents of C are inferentially linked in order to guide C’s
behavior, as the full-blownmind-reader has to do, is a psychologically taxing
9 It may be objected that if M tracks C’s motivational states by detecting some of C’s observ-
able gestures or behaviors, then M may end up being a behavior-reader which only uses
behavioral rules to predict C’s behavior. However, this is not strictly true, since in order
to anticipate how C is going to act M is not relying directly on a rule linking some signs
of motivation in C with C’s behavior. Rather, M is following a “hybrid strategy” which
combines the behavioral signs of C’s motivational state with the attribution of one genuine
representationalmental state: a PPP. Furthermore, this is not a gratuitous stipulation, since
we have a way of providing empirical evidence that this is the case. As stated in footnote
4, the present proposal requires that a mind-reading chimpanzee should be capable of at-
tributing PPs with an illusory descriptive face. us it will always be possible to design
an experimental protocol, following the general lines proposed by Lurz and Krachun (as
suggested in footnote 5), to empirically test whether M indeed attributes PPPs instead of
being a mere behavior-reader.
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task for several reasons. It requires not only representing and “holding in
mind” dierent descriptive and directivemental states, but also representing
how they “t” together, working out which are the semantic and/or logical
links between their respective contents, and how theymay jointly determine
a particular action. At least prima facie, this seems to be tough cognitive
work.10
Let us turn next to the attributions of pushmi-multiple-pullyu (PMPs)
representations. In this case, our mind-reader M is capable of attributing to
C the perception of dierent aordances in an object O.More specically, M
will be capable of attributing to C, in dierent contexts, dierent PMPs, each
of them composed by a complex descriptive face in which the same object
is represented as aording one of many dierent possibilities of action and,
consequently, is associated with one of many potential imperative contents.
Now, onemaywonder: how is this dierent frombeing capable of attributing
to C dierent descriptive mental sates about O’s aordances and dierent
directive mental states?
Even though it may seem harder to draw a clear distinction in this case,
I think that there is still a relevant dierence between the mind-reader M
which attributes PMPs representations and a full-blownmind-reader. Firstly,
even though M will be able to attribute to C the perception of a range of
dierent aordances on the same object O, and a range of dierent goals to-
wardsO, the representation of each aordance of Owill be rigidly connected
to one and only one corresponding goal towards O.is is so, because the
prescriptive content attributed to C will issue a command to act precisely as
C perceives that O aords. us, if C has a PMP with the content ‘eatable
food there!’, the prescriptive content will be: ‘go there and eat the food!’ And
this should allow M to immediately predict how C is going to act: as the
prescriptive face of the PMP commands.
Clearly, then, these are not detached descriptive and directive represen-
tations that M may combine at will. Rather, they should be thought as dif-
ferent pre-xed pairs of two-faced representations about the same object O
thatM can attribute to C.us, whatMneeds to do is to work out which pair
of ‘perception of O’s aordance / goal towards O’ should be attributed to C,
given C’s context andmotivations. But, once that is done, Mwill be attribut-
ing both contents simultaneously and this is what will allowM to predict di-
rectly, without further cognitive steps, how C is going to act. Now, all this is
10 Following a similar line of reasoning, Butterll and Apperly also acknowledge that one
of the reasons why full-blown mindreading is a cognitively demanding task, which con-
sumes workingmemory and other scarce cognitive resources, is that it involves attributing
propositional attitudes which interact with each other in “uncodiable complex ways.” Cf.
(Butterll and Apperly 2013, 610).
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clearly dierent, and arguably simpler, than what a full-blown mind-reader
will have to do. Unlike the latter, M will not need to track the inferential
links between the contents of dierent detached mental states in order to
predict C’s behavior.
e contrast is even more acute if we accept that full-blown mind-
readers must possess a full-range of mental concepts and must be capable of
representing virtually any type of mental content, as well as all sorts of re-
lations between mental states, environment and behavior (Hutto et al. 2011;
Apperly and Butterll 2009). All this makes full-blown mindreading a so-
phisticated and exible ability that can be used in a general way, in many
dierent contexts. But, it also dramatically increases the cognitive complex-
ity of having to select, from a very wide and rich collection, those specic
mental states that can be appropriately combined in inferences to lead each
agent to act as she or he does in a particular situation. In contrast, the attrib-
utor of PMPs is only capable of attributing to other creatures the detection of
a limited and already xed combination of two-faced representations about
what is out there in the world, what possibilities of actions it aords, and
how one should act towards it.
Furthermore, even if we turn our attention to other minimal varieties
of mindreading on oer, a crucial dierence with the present proposal re-
mains. We may, for example, think of models of mindreading that impose
limitations on the kinds of mental attitudes that the mind-reader is capa-
ble of attributing. One clear case are those proposals according to which
minimal mind-readers—like non-human primates or human infants—are
only capable of attributing some “basic” mental states, like perceptions and
goals, to others. Or we may think about proposals according to which ba-
sic mind-readers are capable of tracking only somemental contents of other
creatures and only some of its inferential links, abandoning the more de-
manding varieties of inferential holism.11 In any case, the complexity of the
task which mind-readers face is reduced, because the variety and amount of
mental states, and of inferential links, that must be represented is severely
restricted. Nevertheless, as long as what thesemind-readers attribute are de-
tached mental states, they will still need to select which set of mental states
to attribute to another creature C, and to track the inferential links between
them in order to predict C’s behaviors. is is a demand that a pushmi-
pullyumind-reader will not need tomeet. And this is the very specic sense
11 According to the most radical varieties of holism, in order to attribute a mental state, like
a belief, to an agent, it is necessary to situate it in a maximally rich and complex web of
othermental states logically related to it.ere are compelling arguments in favor of aban-
doning such a position, especially when we are interested in animal minds (Glock 2000;
Finkelstein 2007).
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in which the attribution of PPs to others purports to be even simpler than
other minimalist rivals.
3.2 Mindreading andattributionofpushmi-pullyus inhuman in-
fants
Another interesting issue to consider is whether the dierent varieties of
pushmi-pullyu mindreading presented so far could also be extended to hu-
man infants.12 It is frequently claimed that human infants havemindreading
abilities that are more basic and primitive than those of older children and
adults, and many alternative ways of understanding those early capacities
have been proposed. But, are there reasons to think that these simpler ca-
pacities could also consist in attributing pushmi-pullyus to others? Is this at
least a viable hypothesis? Although this issue deserves a much more careful
and detailed examination, let me oer a few tentative comments on why I
think the varieties of mindreading which I have presented may be fruitfully
extended to human infants.13
Let us focus, rst, on some other experiments on infant goal attribution
which may seem hard to t in the present account. According to Michael
and Christensen (2016), there is a large body of research providing evidence
that infants attribute goals to others by exibly drawing on dierent kinds
of contextual information, including information about the agent’s previ-
ous activities, preferences and other psychological states. In one of these
studies, Woodward (1998; 2005) found out that infants take into account the
prior actions of agents when attributing goals to them. In her study, 5 to
12-month-old infants were habituated to an event in which an agent, facing
an array of two toys, A and B, systematically reached for toy A. During the
proper test, the positions of the toys were switched and infants saw two alter-
nated events: on some occasions, the agent preserved the original path, but
12 In a recent paper, Michael (2015) draws on Millikan’s notion of “unicepts” to defend that
infantsmaybe be attributing beliefs to others by as early as 6months. My proposal, instead,
is that what infants are attributing to others are not beliefs but pushmi-pullyu representa-
tions. I am, then, making use of a dierent notion fromMillikan’s work, and applying it to
explore a dierent way of understanding infant mindreading. Anyway, although I will not
be able to do that here, it would be interesting to explore the possibility that infants (and
chimpanzees) may be using unicepts to attribute dierent kinds of PPs.
13 Such an extension would bring the additional benet of allowing us to view the mind-
reading abilities of non-human primates as continuous—at least to a certain extent—with
mindreading in humans. It would be possible to argue, for example, that our closest evo-
lutionary relatives evolved some basic mindreading abilities and mechanisms which are
similar to those deployed by human infants (and may be also similar to the ones that hu-
man adults exhibit in their more immediate and non-reexive interactions with others).
is does not imply denying, of course, that humansmay also have additionalmechanisms,
operating fromearly infancy onwards, which are not present in other species (Barrett 2015).
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ended up reaching toy Bwhile, in others, the path was changed but the agent
kept reaching for toy A. Now, infants looked longer when the agent reached
for toy B.is suggests that they interpreted that the agent had the goal of
reaching a specic object, rather than a specic location. But it also suggests,
according to Michael and Christensen, that in attributing this specic goal,
infants were taking into account the previous behavior of the agent during
the habituation phase. More specically, it can be argued that infants saw the
selection of toy A over B in the habituation phase as revealing the preference
of the agent for toy A over toy B, and that they expected this preference to
guide the agent’s action in the test situation.
Later studies suggest, furthermore, that infants may be sensible to other
psychological states of agents, besides their preferences, when they are at-
tributing goals to them. Luo and Baillargeon (2007), for example, ran a test
with a habituation phase that included two conditions. In the “visible object”
condition, the agent could see that there was another object B, but system-
atically chose object A. In the “hidden object” condition, there was a second
object present but the agent could not see it. In the proper test, the agent se-
lected one of the two objects. When 12.5-month-old infants had experienced
the “visible object” condition, they expected the agent to keep choosing the
same toy which she or he had repeatedly chosen in the habituation phase,
but they did not show such an expectation when they had previously expe-
rienced the “hidden object” condition.
According to one way of interpreting these tests’ results, then, infants
would be integrating information about dierent psychological states of
agents—like their preferences, their perceptual states and their goals—in
order to predict how they are going to act. In other words, infants would
be attributing detached mental states, and tracking their holistic inferential
links, instead of merely attributing PPs. Now, I do not think this is the only
plausible interpretation of the evidence. We could think, instead, that in-
fants do attribute PPs, while also being sensitive to the previous actions of
the agents (and not to their mental states). us, during the habituation
phase of Woodward’s experiments, infants could be attributing to the agent
two PPPs with the contents ‘there’s an object A (if motivated) / grab it’ and
‘there’s an object B (if motivated) / grab it.’ Now, what our infants learn from
experience is that the agent always chooses object A. Based on that observa-
tion, they come to expect that, when the agent has two PPs about two objects
A and B—that is, when the agent has, at the same time, two perceptual de-
scriptive contents about A and B and two potential goals (to grab one or the
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other)—the PPP that gets “activated” (the one that the agent will actually act
on) is the PPP about object A.14
We can also explain Luo and Baillargeon’s results in terms of the attri-
bution of PPPs. According to this alternative interpretation, in the “visible
object” condition of the habituation phase, when objects A and B are both
visible to the agent, infants would attribute two PPPs to her or him, one
about each object, and will come to learn by experience that this agent al-
ways acts according to what the PPP about object A indicates. In contrast,
in the “hidden object” condition, where there is a second object B present
but the agent cannot see it, the infant will only attribute one PPP to the agent
(about object A). During the proper test, infants who had experienced the
visible object condition will predict that the agent will reach for object A,
because they would have previously learned that, when the agent has two
contrasting PPPs, one about object A and the other about object B, the rst
one gets activated. On the contrary, infants who experienced the “hidden
object” condition will not have attributed two PPPs to the agent in the ha-
bituation phase. During the test, they will attribute two PPPs for the rst
time (one for each object), but they will not have any previous experience
about which of them is the one which usually guides the actions of the agent.
Turning to descriptive mental states, there is evidence that, from quite
early on, infants have some understanding of the perceptual states of oth-
ers; for example, they can establish what objects they can and cannot see
(Sodian et al. 2007). Now, in these experiments, infants are interpreted as
attributing perceptual states about some objects based on their expectations
on how agents are going to act (or not) towards them.us, it seems prima
facie plausible to oer the following alternative account for such data: what
14is interpretation can be questioned on the following grounds. Phillips, Wellman and
Spelke (2002) ran an experiment to test whether infants recognized that a person who
previously looked positively at an object would grasp that object rather than a dierent
one. During the habituation phase, infants saw a woman, rst looking and then picking
up one of two stued animals (toy A).en, infants were shown two types of tests. During
one of them, the woman looked at toy B and then picked it up (consistent actions). During
the other, she looked at toy A but picked up toy B (inconsistent actions). At 12 months
(but not at 8 months) infants looked longer when the actions of looking and grasping were
inconsistent than when they were consistent. Now, this may be taken as indicating that
8-month-olds do not attribute a PPP, with a descriptive and a prescriptive content, but
only isolated goals disconnected from the states of visual attention of the agent. Another
alternative, though, is to claim that these young infants may still be attributing PPPs, but
on the basis of dierent cues than the ones used by older infants. us, initially, infants
may attribute PPPs to agents about all those objects that they can see and that the agents
can reach. Later on, 12-month-old infants will attribute a PPP about an object O to an
agent A only when the latter has a direct line of gaze towards O, is attending to O, etc. (see
my interpretation of Luo and Baillargeons’ test above). But the only thing that has changed
here are the conditions of attribution of the PPP, not its descriptive/directive content.
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infants are attributing to others in these experiments are pushmi-pullyu rep-
resentations which indicate that there is an object nearby and, at the same
time, prescribe a way of acting towards it.
Even more impressive is a range of experiments which has been inter-
preted as indicating that 12 to 18-month-old infants have some understand-
ing of the false beliefs of others and take them into account when predicting
their actions (Onishi and Baillargeon 2005; Buttelmann et al. 2009; South-
gate et al. 2007). Now, while these studies suggest, at least, that infants are
sensible to information which goes beyond what is perceived here and now,
PPs are representations about presently perceived objects or states of aairs.
Consequently, it does not seem appropriate to try to explain the results of
the former in terms of the latter. Nevertheless, I think that such a task is still
feasible if we are willing to make some further adjustments to our original
proposal.
We can begin by distinguishing a new variety of pushmi-pullyu repre-
sentations, that we may call PP*s.e directive content of a PP* is about an
object O having certain properties P1. . .Pn i: (i) agent A, the owner of the
PP*, has previously perceived, at time T1, O having P1. . .Pn; and (ii) A has
not perceived O having properties incompatible with P1. . .Pn since T1. In
a nutshell: PP*s are like traditional PPs but they represent how agents take
the world as being in the present, based on states of aairs that they have
perceived in the past.
Having introduced PP*s, we can now characterize another variety of
mindreadingwhichwill consist in attributing PP*s to others. Amindreading
infant M will be capable of attributing to an agent A a PP* about an object
O having properties P1. . .Pn i: (i) at time T1, M attributed to A a PP with a
descriptive content: ‘object O is P1. . .Pn’ and a prescriptive content: ‘Do A to
/ with object O!’; (ii) since time T1, M has not detected that A encountered
once again Omanifesting dierent properties from the ones perceived at T1.
Putting it bluntly, M will be attributing to A a representation, which was ac-
quired in the past, about how things are now (and about what A should do
about them).
Such a notion should suce, I conjecture, to explain the main evidence
available on false belief attribution in human infants. Let me give one brief
example. In Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) classic experiments, infants see
that an agent A places an object O in one location—a dark box—but A does
not see that, later on, the object switches its location to a light box. If infants
expect A to search for O on the prior location (presumably because they
have attributed a false belief to her or him) they should look longer when A
searches for the object on the light box. Which is, indeed, what happened
with 15-month-old infants.
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Now, imagine that, instead of attributing false beliefs to agent A, infants
detected that A perceived the object being put in the dark box at time T1 and
attributed to A a PPP representation like: ‘Object O is in the dark box / (if
motivated) go there and grab it.’15 Aer that, the infants did not detect A
perceiving object O at a dierent location. As a consequence, they attribute
to A a PPP* with a content ‘Object O is in the dark box / (if motivated) go
there and grab it.’ Clearly then, they will expect the agent to go to the dark
box and not to the light one and they will look longer if what happens is the
latter.16
Of course, it is still an open questionwhether the present proposal would
be able to adequately explain the main data that we have on the complex
capacities of human infants in the domain of social cognition.17 e brief
considerations (over a few studies) that I have sketched here only attempt
to establish that this is a promising alternative which deserves further atten-
tion.
Finally, there is another complex issue which I would like to discuss,
at least in a preliminary way. As is well-known, there are already several
alternative accounts which credit human infants and non-human animals
with rudimentary mindreading capacities.18 Hence, it seems legitimate to
15 I am treating here the location of the object as the critical property of object O which
appears in the content of the PP.
16 On the contrary, the “true-belief ” condition, in which A stays in the room and sees object
O switching locations from the dark box to the light one, can be accounted for in the
following way: at time T1, the infant attributed to A the PPP: ‘object O is in the dark box
/ (if motivated) go there and grab it.’ Soon aerward, the infant perceived how A saw the
object switching locations. As a consequence, the infant attributed toA a newPPPwith the
opposite content ‘Object O is in the light box / (if motivated) go to the dark box and grab it,’
which will give place, aer A leaves the room and comes back, to the attribution of a new
PPP* with the same content of the last PPP.is is what explains why, in this condition,
the infant looks longer to A when she/he searches for the object in the dark box.
17 Am I requiring, like I did in the case of chimpanzees, that the infants in all these experi-
ments should be capable of attributing illusory PPs to others? My main focus in this sec-
tion has not been to give an answer to skeptics who claim that infants are mere behavior-
readers. Rather, I have been interested in a more modest task: showing to those already
convinced that we have good evidence on infant mindreading, that endowing infants with
the capacity to attribute PPs to others can account for some of those studies. For this rea-
son, I would like to remain provisionally neutral on whether we should also ask infant
mind-readers to be able to attribute illusory PPs. Anyway, those who consider that a good
answer to the skeptics about infant mindreading is needed can easily add the requirement
that to qualify as mind-readers, infants should be capable of attributing illusory PPs to
other’s, and design new protocols in order to gather relevant evidence on when infants can
actually accomplish such a task (as suggested by Lurz and Krachun 2011).
18 us, for example, some researchers claim that infants and animals are only capable of
attributing to others some basic mental states (like intentions, desires, perceptions, etc.),
while they are not capable of attributing more sophisticated ones (e.g., beliefs) (Call and
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ask: are there good reasons to prefer the present proposal to its rivals or, once
again, to consider it at least a worthwhile alternative to develop? Although
this topic would require further development and discussion, I will present
here one preliminary reason which favors the present account over some of
its rivals.
To the best ofmy knowledge, all the alternative varieties of simplemind-
reading on oer involve the attribution of detached mental states. In addi-
tion, at least some of them also explicitly require that simple mind-readers
show some appreciation of the holistic inferential links between the dierent
detached mental states of the others, as well as some understanding of how
their behavior will vary as a result of the ways in which their mental states
get inferentially combined.19 Now, as Zawidzki (2011) argues, many current
experiments on infant mindreading do not strictly test for such an appreci-
ation of holism (not even for a moderate holism).ey are not designed to
assess, for example, whether infants are capable of tracking dierent ways
in which the same mental states can cause dierent behaviors depending
on which other mental states the agent has and how they are inferentially
combined. e same goes, I think, for current studies on the mindreading
abilities of non-human primates which, as far as I can see, do not test the
capacity of animals to attribute many inferentially interrelated mental states
to others, but only their abilities to attribute isolated mental states (having
an internal goal, seeing an object or not seeing it, etc.).
But, then, if experiments on young infants’ and non-human animals’
mindreading abilities do not test for holism and extant evidence can be inter-
preted as suggesting that these creatures are only correlating some particular
mental states with specic behaviors, why should we think that what these
basic mind-readers are attributing are detached mental states with holisti-
cally and inferentiallymediated causal inuence on behavior? It seemsmore
parsimonious to claim, instead, that they are attributing some kind of PPs to
others, which allow them to predict the agents’ behaviors without having to
Tomasello 2008; Wellman 2014). Other well-known alternative consists in dierentiating
two dierent mindreading systems (Apperly and Butterll 2009). According to this last
proposal, human infants and some non-human animals are capable of using the more
primitive system, which allows them to have an implicit and fast—but also limited—
understanding of beliefs, whereas from preschool onwards, children become capable of
understanding beliefs in an explicit, deliberate, exible and expansive way.
19 Wellman (2014, 88–90, 179–184), for example, defends a progressive understanding of the
interplay of several mental states which begins in infancy. See also Call and Tomasello
(2008, 191). On the contrary, the “minimal theory of mind” defended by Apperly and But-
terll does not endorse such a requirement. e “registrations” that infants and animals
would attribute to others, according to the authors, must have their eects on actions in-
dependently of each other and of any other mental state (see Apperly and Butterll 2009,
963).
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go through the laborious and cognitively demanding process of tracking the
inferential links between their dierentmental states.is gain in simplicity
seems to be, at least prima facie, a good reason to put some eort into the
development of the present account.
To summarize: in the last decades, proposals that seek to clarify both
the level and distinctive features of the mindreading abilities of non-human
animals, without crediting them with full-blown mindreading, have our-
ished. is paper can be read as an eort to contribute to this debate by
extending and complementing some ideas, originally presented in Lurz and
Krachun (2011), in order to develop a new way of understanding the va-
rieties of mindreading that some non-human primates, like chimpanzees,
may have. To accomplish such a task, I have distinguished three dierent
types of basic mindreading, each mainly consisting in the capacity to at-
tribute some variety of pushmi-pullyu representations to others, and I have
contrasted them with full-blown mindreading. Furthermore, I have sug-
gested that pushmi-pullyu mindreading might be fruitfully extended to in-
fant mindreading, and I have given one preliminary reason to favor it over
some of its rivals. Much more should be done, both conceptually and em-
pirically, to develop the present proposal and to evaluate its merits and lim-
itations. Here, I have only tried to take some initial steps in that direction.
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